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Case No. 20070740-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Mark Scott, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for four counts of burglary, a second 
degree felony, two counts of theft, a second degree felony, and two counts of theft, a 
class B misdemeanor. This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-
103(2)(e) (West 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Is the evidence sufficient to support Defendant's jury convictions for burglary 
and theft? 
Standard of Review. A jury verdict is afforded great deference. State v. 
Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994). Therefore, the Court views "the evidence 
and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict." 
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 18,10 P.3d 346. The Court will not reverse the jury 
verdict for insufficient evidence unless "the evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable such that reasonable minds must have ertertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime for which he or she was 
convicted.'" Id. (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1212 (Utah 1993)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (West 2004): 
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit: . . (b) 
theft[.] 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed in a 
dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (West 2004): 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control 
over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9): 
The brief of the appellant shall contain . . . [a]n argument. The 
argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant 
with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for 
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to 
the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party 
challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that 
supports the challenged finding. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Charge. Defendant was charged with four counts of burglary, a second 
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (West 2004), two counts of 
theft, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (West 
2004), and two counts of theft, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE 
ANN. §76-6-404 (West 2004). R29-31. 
Conviction. Following a two-day jury trial, Defendant was convicted as 
charged. R62; R208:205. 
Sentence. The trial court imposed indeterminate terms of one-to-fifteen years 
for each of the six felony counts and 180-day jail terms for each of the two 
misdemeanor counts. R173-74. The trial court ordered all terms to run 
concurrently. R174. The trial court also ordered Defendant to pay a fine and to 
make restitution to the two identified victims. R174-76. 
Timely appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. Rl77. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
Seeking "payback" for a perceived injustice, Defendant and his teenage 
son repeatedly burglarized Dennis Weaver's cabin, and two others, located in 
remote Cache County, in Hardware Park Estates, during November 2005. 
R208:4; see also R207:120,137,156; R208:26-30. Defendant's son knew that what 
they were doing was wrong, but felt that he "had no choice in the matter. It was 
either I do that or I get punished." R208:23; see also id. at 47. 
* * * 
Dennis Weaver closed his cabin for the winter season on October 26, 2005. 
R207:124-125. When he returned the day after Christmas, he found the cabin had 
been burglarized, with many possessions stolen. Id. at 125. Roger Godfrey closed 
his cabin on October 14, 2005. Id, at 157. He learned that it had been burglarized 
only after his neighbor, Weaver, called to report it. Id. A third cabin was also looted 
during the same time period, but the unidentified owner never reported his losses to 
law enforcement. R208:19, 26-28. 
Detective Talbot, of the Weber County Sheriffs Office, learned of the Cache 
1
 Defendant's brief recites the evidence in the light most favorable to his 
version of the events. In keeping with well-established appellate practice, this brief 
will recite the facts in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v. Finder, 
2005 UT 15 If 2,114 P.3d 551; State v. Kruger, 2000 UT 60 | 2 , 6 P.3d 1116; State v. 
Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 351 (Utah 1996). 
4 
County burglaries while he was investigating Defendant for unrelated burglaries 
and thefts in Weber County. Id. at 49-50. As part of that investigation, Detective 
Talbot made frequent contact with Defendant's teenage son, Christopher, leaving 
his business card, in case Christopher ever had any information he wanted to share. 
Id. at 50; see also id at 23. 
Following his parents' separation, and with the encouragement of his mother, 
Defendant's then-wife, Cynthia, Christopher contacted Detective Talbot in October 
2006. R208:50; see also R 207: 202,208,213; R208:26. Having decided that "what he 
was doing to other people wasn't right," and that he "should tell Jason Talbot," 
Christopher admitted his own and Defendant's guilt in the Cache County cabin 
burglaries. R208:25-26. According to Christopher, Defendant and he made four 
consecutive night-time trips to the remote cabin area in the Fall of 2005. Id. at 19-22, 
27. 
A. First trip: burglary and theft of unknown person's cabin.2 
The first night, they drove to the locked gate leading to Weaver's property. 
Id. at 6. This initial gate allowed entrance into the Hardware Park Estates. R207:137. 
2
 The burglary and theft of the unknown person's cabin was charged in counts 
five and six. See R30. Alternatively, the prosecutor argued that the jury could also 
convict Defendant for counts five and six based on the second burglary and theft of 
Weaver's cabin, which did not occur until the fourth night. See R208:174-75. 
5 
They stopped the truck, walked past the gate, and went into an unknown person's 
cabin, entering though an unlocked sliding glass door. R208:6-7. Defendant and 
Christopher stole "some food and stuff out of the first cabin." Id. at 6. Christopher 
estimated that they stole approximately $100 worth of food. Id. at 19. Because their 
backpacks were so heavy, Defendant and Christopher left them at the cabin and 
returned to the gate. Id. at 7. They then drilled the locks, opened the gate, and 
drove back to the cabin to retrieve their packs. Id. at 8. 
Before leaving that night, Defendant and Christopher also drove to the gate 
leading to Dennis Weaver's property, cutting that lock with bolt cutters. Id. at 8-9. 
Because it was turning light, however, they did not then enter Weaver's cabin. Id. at 
9; see also id. at 27. Cynthia recalled Defendant returning home with " a bunch of 
canned goods, food. Some clothing, some -1 can't remember everything." R207:189. 
B. Second trip: first burglary and theft of Weaver's cabin.3 
The next night, Defendant and Christopher made a second trip to Weaver's 
cabin. R208:9, 27. Defendant pried open the back door with a pry bar. Id. at 9. 
They took "almost everything that was in the cabin food wise," approximately $200 
worth. R207:137; R208:19-20. They also took a Remington .22 rifle, a couple of 
3
 The first burglary and theft of Weaver's cabin was charged in counts one 
and two. See R29-30; see also R20&170-71. 
6 
spotting scopes, nearly all of the bank of batteries used to power the cabin, a 
Craftsman drill, and a power inverter. R207:128,132; R208:10,14. The stolen goods 
were stored in a semi-trailer borrowed from Defendant's then-employer, Bobby 
Eliason. R208:15. 
C. Third trip: first burglary and theft of Godfrey's cabin,4 
The third night, Defendant"wanted to go back and see if there was anything 
else left in there/7 Id. at 16. Rather than revisiting Weaver's cabin, however, 
Defendant and Christopher broke into Godfrey's cabin, "a cabin above Dennis 
Weaver's." Id. at 17. They stole many items including a generator, two solar panels, 
solar batteries, alcohol, a trailer, R208:17, two 4-D batteries, four deep cycle batteries, 
id. at 20, a .22 rifle, id. at 18, a Direct TV system, generator, R207:160, Mandella, 
cordless drill, air compressor, and various other items. See R207:165-70. These stolen 
items were also stored in the semi-trailer, alongside Weaver's possessions. R208:21.5 
4
 The first burglary and theft of Godfrey's cabin was charged in counts three 
and four. R30; R208:172-73. 
5
 Prior to Defendant's trial, Godfrey was prosecuted for making false 
statements to a law enforcement officer regarding the number of things taken from 
his cabin. R207:173-74. Godfrey received punishment for this class B misdemeanor, 
including probation, community service, a fine, and was required to attend a 
thinking errors counseling class. Id. at 182. Although the initial report contained 
false statements, many items in the report were recovered and returned to Godfrey 
by the police. Id. at 164-165,166,170-172. 
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D. Fourth trip: second burglary and theft of Godfrey's and Weaver's 
cabins,6 
On the fourth night, Defendant, Christopher, and Brandon another of 
Defendant's sons and Christopher's half-brother returned to the Hardware Park 
Estates, where they again broke into both Weaver's and Godfrey's cabins, "and got a 
little more stuff." R208:21; see also id. at 22,28-30,36. In particular, they took more 
alcohol from Godfrey's cabin, or about "every bottle that was almost in there," id. at 
22, leaving only two bottles behind. R207:161. The stolen goods were again stored 
in the semi-trailer, and Brandon took two totes full of alcohol home with him. 
R208:22. 
Christopher told Detective Talbot that the stolen cabin property could be 
found in two semi-trailers, belonging to Eliason, Defendant's former employer, and 
also in Parnell Green's shop, Richochet Trucking, where Defendant was then 
employed. R208:53-54; see also id. at 11-12. And it was. See, e.g., R208:55-57. 
According to Eliason, Defendant borrowed the two trailers from him to move 
his belongings, but when Defendant kept them longer than expected, Eliason put 
pin locks in the trailers to prevent Defendant from taking them. R208:94-95. 
6
 The second burglary and theft of Godfrey's cabin was charged in counts 
seven and eight. R30; R208:175-76. As noted, in n.2 supra, the second burglary and 
theft of Weaver's cabin was charged in counts five and six. R208:174-75. 
8 
Defendant still managed to take the trailers, but Eliason successfully retrieved them 
before they were to be impounded. R208:95. 
Defendant contacted law enforcement after Eliason reclaimed his trailers, 
R208:95-96, claiming that Eliason had stolen the trailers and $100,000 of tools and 
other goods inside. R208:143. A warrant was issued for Eliason's arrest. R208:96. 
When police arrived to arrest Eliason, however, he was able to prove his ownership 
of the trailers. R208:95-96. Inside the trailers, officers found much of the stolen 
property Defendant and Christopher had taken from the cabins. R208:95-96; see also 
id. at 55-56. 
Stolen property was also found in Green's shop. R208:103. After Defendant 
had to move off of Eliason's property, Green offered Defendant a mechanic's job 
and allowed him to buy a trailer to live in. R208.100. Green allowed Detective 
Talbot inside his shop and opened the trailers. R208:103. The evidence found in all 
locations "ended up being close to four semi trailers full/' R208:82. 
In addition to the above evidence, Defendant spoke of his desire to burglarize 
Weaver's cabin to both Cynthia and Christopher. R207:188. Defendant and Weaver 
had known each other for about seven years. R207:147. Weaver rented property to 
Defendant in Weber County. Id. at 122. Defendant, Cynthia, and Christopher, also 
lived in a travel trailer on the property. Id. at 186. After Defendant accumulated 80-
9 
100 cars on the property, however, city officials informed Weaver that he would 
need to remove the cars because of zoning regulations. Id. at 122. Weaver helped 
Defendant move the cars off the property to Defendant's new rental. Id. at 122-23. 
When Defendant didn't have the money to pay the rent at the new property, 
Weaver loaned him $200. Id. at 123. Weaver also helped Defendant's family over 
the years, bringing them items "for one Christmas" "{s]ome food one other time" 
and //[s]ome clothing to kind of help him out." Id. at 123-124. Cynthia believed that 
Weaver had "helped [them] out quite a bit," and helped Defendant find jobs or paid 
Defendant to do odd jobs for Weaver. Id. at 186. Weaver took Defendant 
snowmobiling and they visited his cabin. Id. at 124,149. Weaver also spent time 
with Christopher. Id. at 150. Christopher had been to Weaver's cabin "a couple of 
times and spent a couple of different nights there." Id. According to Cynthia, 
"[Defendant] said that he was going to go up and see what he could get from 
Dennis because he figured Dennis owed him for losing whatever he lost on the 
property we were staying at." R207:188. Christopher heard Defendant say that he 
wanted "payback to Dennis Weaver." R208:5. 
Finally, Defendant and Christopher were identified in the area of the 
cabins on four occasions, in a truck towing a trailer. R208:146,147,148. A Weber 
County Deputy Sheriff pulled Defendant over on three occasions in 2005, on 
10 
October 8, November 21, and December 28. R 208:146,147. Each time Defendant 
was driving with Christopher in the same vehicle, pulling a trailer with a light 
problem. Id. A Riverdale City officer also saw Defendant and Christopher in a 
truck towing a trailer in March of 2005. R208:147-48. Each of these occurrences 
was in the early hours of the morning, between 3:16 a.m. and 5:28 a.m. R208:146, 
147,148. 
Defendant did not testify at trial and did not call any witnesses. R208:161; see 
also 156-57. In closing argument, trial counsel theorized that the "most likely 
candidate in all of [the crimes]" was Christopher, R208: 192, and that "there's as 
much evidence now that it was Brandon as there is that it was [Defendant]," who 
committed the crimes with Christopher. R208:187. In support, trial counsel argued 
that "the only thing the state has is Chris's statement and he points the finger at his 
dad." R208:180. Trial counsel also emphasized the lack of fingerprint evidence 
connecting Defendant to the crimes. R208:181, 189-91. Finally, trial counsel 
challenged Cynthia's testimony because she was divorcing Defendant and fighting 
for custody of Christopher. R208:188. Cynthia also had a conviction for use of 
methamphetamines and admitted to using drugs with Christopher. Id. 
11 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 
jury convictions for multiple counts of burglary and theft should be rejected for 
several reasons. First, it is inadequately briefed. Second, he has not marshaled 
the evidence. Third, the evidence in fact sufficed to support the jury verdicts. 
Therefore, Defendant has not, and cannot, show either plain error or ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT DEFENDANTS 
JURY CONVICTIONS FOR BURGLARY AND THEFT 
A. Defendant's sufficiency challenge to his multiple convictions for 
burglary and theft is inadequately briefed. 
In Point I of his brief, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support his jury convictions on multiple charges of burglary and theft, asserting that 
the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. Aplt. Br. at 13-16. 
Specifically, Defendant asserts that" [t]he defense pointed out that it is very obvious 
in this case that there is a lot of inconsistencies] in testimonies. There were at least 
a few things said by almost everyone who testified, that were inconsistent with 
previous statements/7 Aplt. Br. at 15-16. These two sentences constitute the sum 
12 
total of Defendant's insufficiency analysis. See id. Accordingly, Defendant's 
sufficiency challenge is inadequately briefed and should not be considered. See State 
v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, % 15, 72 P.3d 138 (refusing to consider inadequately 
briefed argument) (citation omitted); Mackay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941, 947-48 (Utah 
1998). 
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires an appellant to 
include his "contentions and reasons . . . with respect to the issues presented/' 
including "citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." 
Utah courts have consistently held that issues not properly briefed should not be 
addressed on appeal See State v. Warelwm, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989). "'[A] 
reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent 
authority cited/" State v. Snyder, 932 P.2d 120,130 (Utah App. 1997) (alteration in 
original) (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,450 (Utah 1988)). 
Here, Defendant's four-page insufficiency argument contains citation to, and 
discussion of, pertinent case authority, but as noted, his actual analysis of the 
claimed insufficiency constitutes all of two sentences. See Aplt. Br. 15-16. This 
Court has previously recognized that "a one-sentence assertion that the action ... 
was improper" is inadequate. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co. v. Graham, 2008 UT 
App 207, \ 17 n. 5,186 P.3d 1012. Defendant nowhere applies the cited authorities 
13 
to the facts of this case. Aplt. Br. at 13-16. Moreover, he nowhere identifies the 
elements of burglary or theft that he believes to have been insufficiently proven, let 
alone demonstrates how the evidence, and reasonable inferences therefrom, is 
insufficient. Aplt. Br. at 13-16. Defendant states that he "is cognizant of the 
requirement to marshal evidence in support of the jury's verdict/' and submits that 
"he has done [so] in the setting forth the facts." Aplt. Br. at 15. But the fact section 
of Defendant's brief is also inadequate. Defendant summarizes the testimony of 
only four of eleven witnesses and only occasionally supports his characterizations of 
the testimony with specific record cites. See Aplt. Br. at 6-12. Defendant thus fails to 
make any clear assertions connecting the facts, as heard by the trial court, to the 
standards required for a claim of insufficient evidence. State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 
248-50 (Utah App. 1992); Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108,1109 (Utah App. 1995). 
Accordingly, "[Defendant's arguments are imprecise as to the exact errors being 
alleged, providing at best, very cursory analyses." Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., 
2008 UT App 207, ! 1 7 n . 5. 
This Court is not "'a depository in which the appealing party may dump the 
burden of argument and research.'" State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, f 31, 973 P.2d 404 
(quoting Bishop, 753 P.23d at 450)); accord State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 
1998) (citations omitted). Accordingly, Defendant's claim of insufficient evidence 
14 
and error in denying his motion to dismiss should be rejected. See Jaeger, 1999 UT1, 
^ 31 (refusing to consider appellant's claim due to lack of meaningful analysis of 
cited authority); Wareham, 772 P.2d at 966 (refusing to address claim on appeal 
where brief "wholly lack[ed] legal analysis and authority to support [Wareham's] 
argument"); State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 548-49 (Utah App. 1998) (same); State v. 
Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992) (same).7 
B. Defendant has not marshaled the evidence and shown that it is 
insufficient. 
As noted, one of the reasons Defendant's brief is inadequate is his failure to 
marshal the evidence. To succeed on his insufficiency claim, Defendant must 
marshal all of the evidence and demonstrate that it fails to establish the elements of 
7
 In Point II of his brief, Defendant claims that trial counsel performed 
ineffectively for not moving to arrest judgment. Aplt. Br. at 17-25. This claim is also 
inadequately briefed. Defendant cites and discusses case authority, but never 
relates the authorities cited to the facts of this case, or the claimed deficient 
performance. Indeed, Defendant never explains why a motion to arrest judgment 
would have been successful. Rather, Defendant broadly asserts only that no such 
motion was made, that it is "[t]he general practice of defense counsel in criminal 
trials to move for a motion to arrest the judgment/' and that "[t]his is especially true 
when the conviction is not based on substantial reliable evidence/' Aplt. Br. at 20. 
Later in the brief, Defendant broadly asserts that ''there is simply no reason for trial 
counsel not to move the court to arrest the judgment when the evidence against the 
Defendant was so unreliable." Aplt. Br. at 24. Defendant's argument is devoid of 
any analysis of the facts and citation to the record. Aplt. Br. at 17-25. Given these 
failures, Defendant's Point II is devoid of meaningful analysis. Accordingly, 
Defendant's ineffectiveness claim is inadequately briefed and should also be 
rejected. 
15 
burglary and theft. Marshaling is thus an "arduous and painstaking" process. West 
Valley v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 R2d 1311,1315 (Utah App. 1991). Indeed, it 
is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate. Counsel must extricate 
himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully assume the 
adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty of 
marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in 
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of 
supporting evidence, the challenge must ferret out a fatal flaw in the 
evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the 
appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the evidence is 
clearly erroneous. 
Id. This marshaling process "serves the important function of reminding litigants 
and appellate courts of the broad deference owed to the fact finder at trial. Such 
deference is especially appropriate where the fact finder is a jury, whose common 
sense is a valued buffer between the parties." State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732., 739 (Utah 
App. 1990). 
Accordingly, when applying the marshaling standard in a jury setting, as 
here, this Court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and 
will reverse "only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt[.]" State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 (Utah 1989) (quotations and citations 
omitted); see also State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378,381 (Utah App. 1992) (quotations and 
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citations omitted). "When findings of all required elements of the crime can be 
reasonably made from the evidence," however, "including the reasonable inferences 
that can be drawn from it, [the reviewing court] stop[s] [its] inquiry and sustain[s] 
the verdict." State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, f 42,994 P.2d 177. 
Here, Defendant claims to have met this heavy burden in the fact section of 
his brief. Aplt. Br. at 15 ("Defendant submits that even with an extensive 
marshaling of the evidence (which he has done in the setting forth the facts) the 
jury's verdict cannot be supported"). Defendant's claim notwithstanding, he has 
not properly marshaled the evidence, because instead of viewing the facts and 
inferences in the light most favorable to the jury verdicts, he argues the evidence in 
the light most favorable to acquittal. See Aplt. Br. at 6-12. For example, Defendant 
never acknowledges evidence that the stolen property was found in the semi-trailers 
he borrowed from his former employer Eliason, and inside his private area of 
Green's shop. See Aplt. Br. at 6-12; see also R208:53-56. Nor does he mention 
evidence that he and Christopher were stopped in the area of the cabins on three 
different occasions during the time period that the cabins were burglarized. See 
Aplt. Br. at 6-12; see also R208:146-48. Each time Defendant was driving with 
Christopher in the same vehicle, pulling a trailer with a light problem. R208:146-48. 
Each of these occurrences occurred in the early hours of the morning, between 3:16 
17 
a.m. and 5:28 a.m. Id. This objective evidence corroborates Cynthia's and 
Christopher's testimony implicating Defendant as the instigator and primary culprit 
in the cabin burglaries. See, e.g., R207:188-90,213; R208:3-49. The jury verdicts are 
thus well-supported. 
Instead of marshalling the evidence, Defendant merely suggests that it is 
insufficient because "there [was] a lot of inconsistent testimonies. There were at 
least a few things said by almost everyone who testified, that were inconsistent with 
previous statements/' Aplt. Br. at 15-16. But even assuming that constituted proper 
marshaling, "the existence of contradictory evidence or of conflicting inferences 
does not warrant disturbing the jury's verdict." State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91,97 (Utah 
1982) (citation omitted). Thus, even where the evidence is susceptible to multiple 
inferences, so long as the inferences drawn by the jury were reasonable, the verdict-
must be upheld. See Colwell, 2000 UT 8, % 43; Lemons, 844 P.2d at 381. 
C. Because the evidence sufficed, Defendant has not, and cannot, 
show either plain error or ineffective assistance. 
Defendant asserts that the trial court plainly erred in not sua sponte entering a 
directed verdict based on the alleged insufficient evidence, and that trial counsel 
rendered deficient performance in not moving to arrest the judgment. Aplt. at 13, 
16, 17-25. Assuming arguendo that Defendant's brief is adequate for review, 
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Defendant cannot prevail on either claim because he has not shown that the 
evidence was in fact insufficient to support his convictions. 
When reviewing any challenge to a trial court's denial of a motion for a 
directed verdict, the appellate court reviews "the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the 
party moved against/7 State v. Jensen, 2004 UT App 467, % 7,105 P.3d 951 (quotation 
and citation omitted). The Court then "appl[ies] the same standard used when 
reviewing a jury verdict" State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, % 41,70 P.3d 111. The trial 
court's decision will be affirmed if "some evidence exists from which a reasonable 
jury could find that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt/" State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5, If 29, 84 P.3d 1183 (citation omitted). 
Assuming no motion is made, and the claim, as here, is that the trial court 
plainly erred for not sua sponte directing a verdict, an appellant must show "'first 
that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of the crime[s] charged 
and second that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial 
court erred in submitting the case to the jury/" State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288,f32, 
55 P.3d 1131 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 17,10 
P.3d 346). 
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1. Because the evidence sufficed, Defendant has not shown that 
the trial court erred, let alone plainly erred, for not sua sponte 
entering a directed verdict. 
To prove burglary, the State must prove that a defendant "enters or remains 
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with intent to commit ... 
theft." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-202 (West 2004). For purposes of finding a 
Defendant guilty of a second degree felony, the State must prove that the burglary 
"was committed in a dwelling." Id. 
To prove theft, the State must prove that a defendant "obtains or exercises 
unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him 
thereof." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-404 (West 2004). 
Here, the State presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could find 
that the elements of burglary and theft had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Christopher testified that he and the Defendant entered three cabins over the course 
of four nights. R208:19-22,27-30,36. The cabins belonged to Weaver, Godfrey, and 
an unidentified person. Id. Weaver and Godfrey's cabins were each entered on two 
different occasions and items were taken from each cabin both times. Id. The door 
to Weaver's cabin was "pried open and jimmied." R207:126. Defendant and 
Christopher took nearly all of the food stored therein, a Craftsman drill, .22 
Remington rifle, spotting scopes, binoculars, and flashlights. R207:127,132,133,135, 
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136. Defendant and Christopher gained access to Godfrey's cabin by prying a 
window out of its frame. R207:157-58. They took Godfrey's solar panels, Direct TV 
system, generator, solar panel batteries, nearly all of his liquor, an air compressor, 
and many other assorted items. R207:159-61, 163-170. The third owner was not 
identified, but Christopher testified to the entry and the approximately $100 worth 
of food that was stolen from the cabin. R208:6-7,19. Cynthia, Defendant's wife, also 
confirmed that she saw the items taken from the unknown person's cabin. R207:189. 
Christopher, Weaver, and Godfrey each testified that Defendant did not have 
permission to enter any of the three cabins. R208:22-23; R207:137; see also R207:155-
56. Defendant told Cynthia that he was planning "to go up and see what he could 
get from Dennis [Weaver] because he figured [Weaver] owed him," R207:188, and 
that "he saw other cabins that he was going to go back up and check out." R207:190. 
Also, two of Defendant's former employers testified about the trailers that the stolen 
goods were eventually found in. See R208:91-107; see also id. at 53-55. This evidence 
suffices to prove that Defendant unlawfully entered the three dwellings, and 
obtained unauthorized control over the property of the three owners with the 
purpose to deprive each of their property. The evidence thus sufficed to support 
Defendant's conviction for eight counts of burglary and theft, beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
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Given the above, Defendant cannot prevail on his plain error claim. 
Defendant has not shown that the evidence was insufficient to support his 
convictions, let alone "that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that 
the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury." Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, ]f 32 
(quotation and citation omitted). 
2. Because the evidence sufficed, Defendant has not shown that 
the trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to arrest the 
judgment 
As noted, Defendant also claims that trial counsel performed ineffectively for 
not moving to arrest the judgment. Aplt. Br. at 17-25. 
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish both 
prongs of the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, which holds that 
such claims succeed only if the defendant demonstrates: (1) that his counsel's 
performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and (2) that 
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984); see 
also State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App. 1994). A defendant's burden is 
extremely high. An ineffective assistance claim can "succeed[ ] only when no 
conceivable legitimate tactic or strategy can be surmised from counsel's actions." 
State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1241 (Utah App. 1995) (citation and quotations 
omitted). Moreover, counsel is not deficient for not making futile motions. 
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Counsel's failure "to make motions or objections [that] would be futile if raised does 
not constitute ineffective assistance." State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, f 34,989 P.2d 52 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
Here, as explained under Part C(l), the State presented evidence sufficient to 
support a jury's finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant committed the 
Cache County cabin burglaries and thefts. Because the evidence sufficed, Defendant 
cannot show that counsel performed deficiently for not moving to arrest the 
judgment, particularly where trial counsel had already unsuccessfully moved to 
dismiss. See R208:151. Moreover, because the evidence sufficed, Defendant also 
cannot show that he was prejudiced. He cannot show that, had counsel moved to 
arrest judgment, the trial court would have granted the motion or that the outcome 
would have been different. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
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